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The author considers the relationship of the United States toward the for-
mer Yugoslavia, based on declassified documents (1948-1991) of the
American intelligence agency.  The US showed no particular interest in
Yugoslavia after 1945, considering it a reliable Soviet ally.  When the
conflict broke out between Stalin and Tito in 1948, it was believed that a
Soviet military intervention against Yugoslavia was probable and that
there was a possibility of American military assistance to Yugoslavia.  In
the mid-50s, it was evaluated that in the event of an armed conflict
between the western and eastern blocs, the Yugoslav army could be relied
upon as a Western ally.  During the 1960s, American analyses became
more critical of Yugoslav foreign policy, which was in open contradiction
to Western interests (non-aligned movement, relationship toward the
Israeli-Arab war). During the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,
American policy proposes a “very cautious and well-calculated” position
toward post-Tito Yugoslavia, with America avoiding any kind of leading
role or hasty initiatives.  Evaluations of the internal situation in Yugoslavia
grow with the creation of a unified Yugoslavia (which is in American inter-
ests), to the total disintegration of the country (the most dangerous sce-
nario being the eventual outbreak of armed conflict, which would be halt-
ed with the introduction of Soviet troops into the eastern parts of former
Yugoslavia and western troops into Slovenia and Croatia).  American
analyses do not lose sight of the fact that the regime in Belgrade is
repressive, especially in its relations with Croatia and Kosovo, but con-
clude that the “Belgrade policies, while not ideal, serve western interests.”
Immediately after the end of the Cold War, there appeared a
unique opportunity to access a great number of intelligence
reports and analyses of the two superpowers. The disintegration of
the USSR made it possible to release many analytical materials of
the KGB from the recent past. On the other hand, certain collec-
tions of documents of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Council and the US State Department are regu-
larly disclosed in Washington under the Freedom of Information
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Act, Presidential Executive Order 12958 (April 17, 1995), owing
to the efforts of the “Moynihan” parliamentarian commission.
1
The
access to original new documents has provided the professional
community the chance to achieve a more accurate understanding
of many issues and to find answers to the long-standing discus-
sions concerning the essence and reliability of intelligence analy-
ses as well as the adequacy of the analytic methods.2
In many intelligence reports and analyses of the CIA and the
US National Security Council, the situation in the Balkans and in
the Mediterranean region is considered. Surprisingly, instead of
problems of the Balkan NATO allies or members of the Warsaw
Pact, Yugoslavia is most often mentioned.  This article is based
predominantly on newly released documents of the CIA, NSC,
DIA and the US State Department Intelligence & Research
Division, which were declassified between March 1992 and
September 1998. Although in brief form, the document presenta-
tion provides the possibility for studying the evolution of the US
intelligence concepts and estimates concerning post-war
Yugoslavia.
The Stalin-Tito Conflict
The three day long Kremlin bargaining between Stalin and
Churchill and their foreign ministers Molotov and Eden in October
1944, which led to the well-known “percentage agreement” on
the Balkans, allotted to Yugoslavia a balanced position with both
of the Great Powers having equal influence.  During the first post-
war years, the USA and Great Britain demonstrated no great inter-
est concerning the position of Tito’s Yugoslavia, which contrasted
with their ongoing interest in the course of events in Poland and
Czechoslovakia. In most diplomatic and intelligence reports relat-
ed to the period before 1948, the cabinet of Josip Broz Tito is
regarded as the closest ally of the Soviet Union and as a “stan-
dard” Stalinist communist type regime in East Europe. The atten-
tion of the leading circles in the United States to Yugoslavia
increases considerably only when the conflict between Stalin and
Tito is openly acknowledged at the end of June, 1948.
Donald Heath, the American ambassador in Sofia, uses a fig-
urative historical comparison - “a Protestant revolt against the
communist Vatican”3 - when commenting on the sudden break of
relations between the two most closely-linked East European
countries in his report to Washington, dated June 30. On the
same day in a cipher message, the US Military and Naval
Attaches in Belgrade first posed the question of the need for
American military support of Tito against a possible Soviet attack.4
Several days later, the first confidential American-Yugoslav probe


























In their first information after the beginning of the Stalin-Tito
conflict, the Western secret services focus their attention upon the
probability of an outbreak of a military conflict in the Balkans as
the result of a possible Soviet attack on Yugoslavia. From the onset
of the Soviet-Yugoslav crisis, the US military experts closely watch
the course of events and analyze the alternatives that might con-
vert the political controversy into a local war. In a report, submit-
ted to the US National Security Council on November 17, 1949,
four possible options of eventual Soviet actions are enumerated.
In a separate position, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs
formally poses the question of providing military support to the
Tito regime “since without our considerable support we cannot
expect him to achieve a success” against a Soviet invasion.6 In
another memorandum of the American Army Intelligence Agency
dated September 1950, it is noted that: “In case of an attack on
Yugoslavia the United States must be prepared to give military
support, eventually participating with their own forces (underlined
by the author) in the hypothetical military conflict.”7 This com-
pletely new stage in the Balkan policy of the American adminis-
tration is perhaps influenced by the outbreak of the Korean war.
In subsequent CIA reports, dated March 20 and May 4, 1951,
and military intelligence reports, dated September 24 of the same
year, the US experts still estimate as “serious” the probability of a
Soviet attack on Yugoslavia.8 At the same time Washington and
Belgrade publicly announce the contents of an agreement
between the two governments concerning American military sup-
port. The agreement is signed on November 14, 1951.
Yugoslavia in NATO?
The exchange of messages relating to support of Tito, which
occurred between General Omar Bradley and the supreme com-
mander-in-chief of the NATO allied forces in Europe, General
Dwight Eisenhower, is of interest. In a letter to “Ike” Eisenhower
from September 4, 1951, General Bradley notes: “We feel that
the plan for helping Yugoslavia is eventually a NATO matter.” In a
new letter, dated September 19, general Bradley insists on two-
party discussions with representatives of the leading countries in
the pact “to the development of emergency plans for giving direct
military support to Yugoslavia with such forces and facilities as the
United Kingdom, France and Italy may agree to make available to
planning purposes, in addition to those US forces of which you
are aware.”9 Later it is assumed that political discussions in NATO
on the Yugoslav problem may meet with difficulty with some coun-
tries, members of the Pact; therefore, it is suggested that the pro-
viding of military support should be negotiated on a three-party
basis with Great Britain and France. Fears that taking a relevant





































later, at a session of the NATO Council in Paris, the Italian repre-
sentative De Gasperi firmly rejects the idea to discuss the pro-
posed NATO membership of Yugoslavia. (His principal motive is
certainly the continuing Italian-Yugoslav territorial problem of
Trieste). Nevertheless, in the Strategic Concept for the Defense of
the North Atlantic Area (December 9, 1952) it is clearly empha-
sized that:
“Yugoslavia is the only “lapsed satellite”, which, though not a
member of NATO, is likely to join in a defensive war against the
Soviet Bloc and thus afford the Allies considerable psychological
advantage as well as some military aid.”10
At that time, the role of the Balkans in a future European war
is closely linked with the coordination of the actions of the
Yugoslav, Greek and Turkish armies, which finds practical expres-
sion in the creation of the Balkan Pact in 1953. As early as 1951,
such joint military operations are the topic of bilateral and multi-
lateral consultations. In a strictly confidential telegram from the US
embassy in Athens, for instance, the opinion of the Greek prime
minister, Sophokles Veniselos, is quoted: “Should war break out
he believes both Greek and Yugoslav armies would move into
Albania in coordinated fashion in order to remove this threat to
their rear.”11
The military collaboration with Yugoslavia remains on the
agenda even after the normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav relations
and the meeting between Tito and Khrushchev in Belgrade at the
end of May 1955. In 1956 and 1957, the Pentagon chiefs still
include the country in their lists for the providing of military sup-
port.12 The total military aid to Yugoslavia between 1950 and
1957 amounts to 745 million dollars.13 In a Defense Department
report to the National Security Council, dated September 22,
1958, it is explicitly stated that: “Our strongest Allies in the
European area are our NATO Allies. Armed forces of the NATO
countries and those of Spain and Yugoslavia are impressive in
size”.14
At the beginning of the sixties, the analyses of CIA become
more critical, as the fear became more pronounced in the evalu-
ating of Yugoslavia as a leader of the Movement of the Non-
aligned Nations. The foreign policy of Yugoslavia clearly conflicts
with the policies of the Western countries, especially during the
Israeli-Arab war of 1967. At the same time it is pointed out in
many intelligence analyses that the propaganda attacks do not
weaken Tito’s pragmatic efforts to extract benefits for his country
from the global duel confrontation of the Cold-War period. For
instance, in the CIA National Intelligence Estimate (May 23,
1961) it is mentioned that:
“The Yugoslavs, however, have refrained from formal relations

























Greece and Turkey, negotiated in 1953-1954 when a threat from
the Bloc still seemed serious, has become virtually moribund.
Belgrade nevertheless does not altogether dispense with the con-
nection because it provides certain advantages in the relations
with these two countries and because the pact stands as a form of
insurance against a future revival of strong Bloc measures against
Yugoslavia. It is also a form of indirect contact with the Western
defense system, which might one day be useful to Yugoslavia,
even though its political line now condemns NATO.”15
During the sixties the Western intelligence services pay more
attention to the manifestation of ethnic separatism and to the con-
flict within the party (between “the old” and “the young” cadres)
in Yugoslavia. Anti-Yugoslav incidents in Kosovo-Metohia
(Kosmet) and the “infiltration” of Albanians into that region are
reported first. In a CIA report on the “Yugoslav experiment”, con-
siderable space is dedicated to ethnic and national problems:
“It is an immutable fact of Yugoslav political life that most
Serbs and Croats and Slovenes and Macedonians think of them-
selves first as Serbs or Croats or Slovenes or Macedonians and
second, if at all, as Yugoslavs. National and ethnic rivalries are
endemic; they have long constituted a centrifugal force which
cannot long be overcome through liaisons intended to resolve
economic or political issues. Fears of a return to “greater Serb”
hegemony haunt all Yugoslavs except the Serbs; some Croats and
Slovenians speak earnestly of a complete secession which no cen-
tral government could tolerate; and less drastic attacks on the fed-
eral concept come from all regions.”
At the same time the CIA experts are inclined to give better
prospects to the living standards and the future federal develop-
ment of the country, even after the possible death of the symbol of
Yugoslav unity, Tito:
”We believe that, over the long term, the principal accom-
plishments of the Yugoslav system are fairly secure, that
Yugoslavia, even without Tito, will survive essentially intact and will
persist as a hybrid system. We also think, however, that change
and disarray will continue to confront the leadership - especially
the post-Tito leadership - with a variety of serious problems.”16
In the days that followed the Soviet invasion in
Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Western military, diplomatic and
intelligence experts discuss again the need for urgent political and
military aid in the case of a hypothetical Soviet attack on Romania
and Yugoslavia. In spite of the fact that the American diplomatic
agencies in East Europe submit information that: “we have no evi-
dence pointing specifically to preparation for action against
Romania and Yugoslavia,” attention is placed on consolidating
contacts and coordination with the Western countries in talks




































and diplomats.17 In a memorandum dated October 1, 1968,
which was prepared by the US State Department, the possible
forms of political, economic and military support to Yugoslavia
are listed. In the document it is explicitly noted that:
“We should be prepared to engage in military support oper-
ations for Yugoslavia under these circumstances:
(1) Only if requested by the Yugoslavs;
(2) No involvement of US or NATO personnel beyond participa-
tion in delivery operations;
(3) Heavy equipment of a type requiring considerable lead time
for delivery should not be provided;
(4) If portable, relatively easily deliverable equipment can be fur-
nished at any stage of hostilities, we should take all necessary
steps to grant it;
(5) The Yugoslav military genius is in guerrilla-type operations. We
should orient our assistance in that direction.”18
The opportunities for American support are discussed in detail
at a meeting between US President Lyndon Johnson with the
Yugoslav deputy Prime minister, Kiro Gligorov, on October 4,
1968. After his visit to Ljubljana in January 1969, the American
consul in Zagreb provides the opinion of the Slovenian leaders,
Krajger and Brajnik, “that Yugoslavia and the US have a strong
mutual interest in thwarting the linked Soviet moves and, similar-
ly, that the US, in considering how to cope with increased tension
created by the Soviets in North Central Europe, should not lose
sight of Yugoslavia’s needs due to Soviet-created tension in the
Balkans.”19
Post - Tito Yugoslavia
For many years before the death of the aging Yugoslav leader
Tito, American experts study in detail the possible “post-Tito” evo-
lution of the country. In a long 66-page Memorandum of the
National Security Council (September 13, 1971) the possible
options of the US policy in “post-Tito Yugoslavia are considered.”20
One of the most important recommendations is that a very cau-
tious and considered line of conduct should be followed. This is
characteristic for the American policy with respect to Yugoslavia
throughout the whole period until 1992:
“The extent of US involvement must be carefully gauged at each
step so that we do not through our own actions push the
Yugoslavs in directions not in their ultimate best interest. We
must be mindful that even a limited input from outside
Yugoslavia at a key moment in a time of instability could have


























ment of Yugoslav policy. Accordingly, our efforts in the main
should be supplementary and reinforcing, not leading.”
Particular areas of future bilateral collaboration based upon
Yugoslavia’s significance for the protection of American interests
in this part of Europe are considered in the document. Trade
expansion, new American investments and credits, continuing col-
laboration in science and technology as well as intelligence and
defense collaboration (including admittance of Yugoslav army
officers into American military academies) and other extremely
important aspects of national security are among these areas. The
useful exchange of intelligence information about the Warsaw
Pact forces and plans in the Balkans is mentioned in particular.
Concerning the contacts of the secret services, it is explicitly noted
in the report that: “As the transition period approaches in
Yugoslavia, however, it could prove useful to have established
channels for intelligence exchange. To establish such channels we
could respond tentatively to the Yugoslav initiatives, and further
explore the possibility of developing a mutually beneficial
exchange.”
The US intelligence and military experts analyze four possibil-
ities for the future evolution of Yugoslavia, three of them including
a partial or total disintegration of the country, mainly the secession
of Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Macedonia.  In
addition to declaring their support for the preservation of
Yugoslavia’s integrity, the American experts expect (as an ultimate
measure) the possible use of US and NATO forces with the pur-
pose of restoring “the strategic balance” in Europe. In the differ-
ent cases, it is recommended that the leaders in Zagreb and
Ljubljana be advised to restrain from the application of “seces-
sionist plans” which might endanger the stability of Yugoslavia.
The most dangerous scenario considered includes a direct military
confrontation, which leads to the division of parts of Yugoslavia
between the two military and political blocs, the direction of divi-
sion expressing the priorities and differences in the attitude of the
West towards particular Yugoslav republics:
“...The Soviets move troops into Serbia, Macedonia and
Montenegro. In the Security Council we would demand the
dispatch of UN forces to Slovenia and Croatia, trying to force
this action by making clear that in the absence of UN efforts,
the US and NATO would have no recourse but to take steps
to guarantee the continued independence and Western orien-
tation of Croatia and Slovenia. In the absence of UN action,
we would move into the two northern republics.”
Similar such estimates as those in the report dated September
13, 1971, can be found in CIA intelligence reports dated July 5,
1973, September 25, 1979, and February 1, 1980. In the 1973





































relations, which had been overcome only by taking draconian
measures (repressive actions against more than 800 Croatian
functionaries). The general conclusion motivating the position of
the West is that: “Over the years, NATO members have in one way
or another invested heavily in Yugoslavia… It is generally agreed
that while not ideal, Belgrade’s position and policies are advan-
tageous to Western interests…”21 In the intelligence analysis from
1979, serious ethnic and political problems in Yugoslavia in the
eighties are predicted.
“Of crucial importance is the interplay among a number of
central variables, of which the most critical will be the nature of
Soviet initiatives and reactions, the efficacy of Western assistance,
and, above all, the cohesion and adaptability of Tito’s succes-
sors”.
Authors of the document remind us of the serious ethnic
unrest in Kosovo and Croatia in the past decade. Relevant to
Kosovo, Albanian accusations are quoted that the province has
been converted into “an economic and political colony of the
Serbs.” The experts of CIA underline the existence of two hostile
fractions in the Yugoslav leadership, but do not regard as realistic
the possibility of a military putsch or a drastic change in the coun-
try’s policies. As for the position of the Western countries, the
analysis points out that:
“No amount or kind of Western support can stop Tito’s suc-
cessors from engaging in a self-destructive succession struggle or
prevent Yugoslavia’s constituent nationalities from embarking on
a civil war, if they are determined to do so. However, skillfully
timed and carefully designed and orchestrated Western support
could make a very large difference to the consolidation and sur-
vival of a potentially viable post-Tito leadership and thereby to the
preservation of a stable regional, continental and global balance
of power.”22
Within the framework of the continuing Bloc confrontation,
CIA and DIA in their expert analyses underline the role and posi-
tion of Yugoslavia in the case of a possible global conflict. In sev-
eral successive CIA analyses entitled “Warsaw Pact Forces
Opposite NATO” it is explicitly noted that: “...We judge it unlike-
ly that Yugoslavia would grant the Pact permission to use its terri-
tory or that the Pact would use force to advance through
Yugoslavia to attack northern Italy. This judgment is qualified,
however, by our uncertainly concerning future political attitudes
and development in Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era.”23
After Tito’s death, the situation in Yugoslavia and the future
fate of the country are the subject of investigations and discussions
in many research centers connected with US defense and intelli-
gence agencies, such as RAND Corporation, the US Army War

























death of the leader, approximately ten reports related to
Yugoslavia were prepared.24
The CIA analysis, dated January 26, 1983, and the analysis
of the National Security Council (March 14, 1984) are particularly
troublesome. Detailed estimates of the financial, political and eth-
nic crises in Yugoslavia after Tito’s death are provided in the
reports. In the CIA report (1983) concerning the increasingly
strained ethnic relations it is noted that:
“Confrontations among the ethno-national communities have
been a recurrent feature of postwar Yugoslav history and some-
times forced even Tito on the defensive. Economic stringencies are
sharpening the conflict of interest among Yugoslavia’s republics
and provinces. Following Tito’s death, the federal regime lost the
prestige it derived as a result of his dominant authority and unim-
peachable reputation as an ethnic nonpartisan. None of his suc-
cessors has an even remotely comparable reputation.”
In the report, the strained ethnic relations in Croatia and
Bosnia are particularly noted. Special attention is paid to the
“strategic significance” of the ethnic unrest of the Albanians in
Kosovo in 1981. Nevertheless, a firm position is expressed that
Western countries should continue their considerable financial
and economic support to the federal government (2,4 billion dol-
lars) with the purpose of overcoming the aggravated economic
crisis.25 American policy with respect to Yugoslavia is discussed in
a Memorandum of the National Security Council (August 10,
1989) at the end of the Cold War era.26
After the Fall of the Berlin Wall
The intensification of ethnic conflicts based upon increasingly
insurmountable disagreements concerning the “federation or self-
determination” dilemma, as well as the unknown fate of another
multinational country, the USSR, paralyzed American initiatives for
a short time at the beginning of the nineties. The position of the
leading countries predetermined in many respects the develop-
ment of the Yugoslav crisis after 1991, thus converting it into the
bleeding wound of Europe. Many American experts, Professor
Daniel Nelson, for instance, warned that the Balkan Peninsula is
connected with “the future of European security” more closely
than any other part of Eastern Europe because of the precondi-
tions for numerous internal and international conflicts which were
laid in the past.27 The motives for the disengaged position of the
Western institutions at the first stage of the Yugo-conflict are
summed up in one of the expert analyses in the following manner:
(a) The conflict, at least at the beginning, is of internal significance





































(b) The conflict opposes the principle of self-determination in favor
of the idea of the inviolability of European boundaries;
(c) The outbreak of the conflict is at a time of NATO reorientation;
(d) The conflict and any international response to it are regarded
as a test for future ethnic and national conflicts in Europe. The
principle of precedent is considered a serious consideration at
the time of disintegration of one of superpowers, the USSR;
(e) The conflict manifests the differences in the geopolitical orien-
tation of the leading Western countries.28
It was added in other analyses that the position of NATO and
the European Community is influenced predominantly by the polit-
ical line of the United States, which aimed at preserving Yugoslav
federal integrity due to its fears that otherwise, there would be “an
impetus to the USSR disintegration.”29
In 1992, the United States increased its activity and more and
more often the question of dispatching American forces to the
Balkans and conducting special military operations was addressed
on a government level. In 1992-1993, different options of military
operations on the territory of previous Yugoslavia were discussed.
For instance, in the summary report of the US Congress, military
expert John Collins listed eight different possibilities:
A. Withdrawal of the UN peace-making forces because it is
impossible to solve the problem by a military intervention;
B. Preserving the status quo;
C. Conducting peace-making missions by the peaceful efforts of
military forces;
D. Humanitarian actions in compliance with Resolution 770 of the
UN Security Council;
E. Actions for “isolating the battlefield” by air blockade, econom-
ic sanctions and arms embargo;
F. Retaliation operations with bombing of important military and
industrial targets;
G. Forced peace-making actions aimed at separating the partici-
pants in the armed conflict;
H. A modified version of the previous option by expelling the
Serbian and Croatian forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina
and restoration of the pre-war boundaries.30
The events which followed proved that most influential options
presented in the intelligence and political expert reports find con-
crete expression in the American policies related to the Yugo-cri-
sis: peace-making operations, humanitarian actions, embargo,
air blockade, air attacks of the NATO forces against military and
civilian targets, at first in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at present

























The Yugo-crisis was a springboard for a great number of new
serious economic, military, and political problems for the Balkan
countries and Europe as a whole, as well as for the world com-
munity. The ethno-religious and territorial controversies which
have been for decades impossible to overcome define at present
the military and political situation in the Balkans as a “permanent
crisis”, with a trend toward long-term instability of the peninsula
due to these centers of instability.
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